A case for privacy paternalism?

This is the second part of a series of three articles exploring the issues with the privacy self management framework and potential alternatives. The first part of the series can be accessed here.

Background

The current data privacy protection framework across most jurisdictions is built around a rights based approach which entrusts the individual with having the wherewithal to make informed decisions about her interests and well-being.[1] In his book, The Phantom Public, published in 1925, Walter Lippmann argues that the rights based approach is based on the idea of a sovereign and omnicompetent citizens, who can direct public affairs, however, this idea is a mere phantom or an abstraction. [2] Jonathan Obar, Assistant Professor of Communication and Digital Media Studies in the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities at University of Ontario Institute of Technology, states that Lippmann’s thesis remains equally relevant in the context of current models of self-management, particularly for privacy.[3] In the previous post, Scott Mason and I had looked at the limitations of a ‘notice and consent’ regime for privacy governance. Having established the deficiencies of the existing framework for data protection, I will now look at some of the alternatives proposed that may serve to address these issues.

In this article, I will look at paternalistic solutions posed as alternatives to the privacy self-management regime. I will look at theories of paternalism and libertarianism in the context of privacy and with reference to the works of some of the leading philosophers on jurisprudence and political science. The paper will attempt to clarify the main concepts and the arguments put forward by both the proponents and opponents of privacy paternalism. The first alternative solution draws on Anita Allen’s thesis in her book, Unpopular Privacy,[4] which deals with the questions whether individuals have a moral obligation to protect their own privacy. Allen expands the idea of rights to protect one’s own self interests and duties towards others to the notion that we may have certain duties not only towards others but also towards ourselves because of their overall impact on the society. In the next section, we will look at the idea of ‘libertarian paternalism’ as put forth by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler[5] and what its impact could be on privacy governance.

Paternalism

Gerald Dworkin, Professor Emeritus at University of California, Davis, defines paternalism as “interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm.” [6] Any act of paternalism will involve some limitation on the autonomy of the subject of the regulation usually without the consent of the subject, and premised on the belief that such act shall either improve the welfare of the subject or prevent it from diminishing.[7] Seana Shiffrin, Professor of Philosophy and Pete Kameron Professor of Law and Social Justice at UCLA, takes a broader view of paternalism and includes within its scope not only matters which are aimed at improving the subject’s welfare, but also the replacement of the subject’s judgement about matters which may otherwise have lied legitimately within the subject’s control.[8] In that sense, Shiffrin’s view is interesting for it dispenses with both the requirement for active interference, and such act being premised on the subject’s well-being.

The central premise of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty is that the only justifiable purpose to exert power over the will of an individual is to prevent harm to others. “His own good, either physical or moral,” according to Mill, “is not a sufficient warrant.” However, various scholars over the years have found Mill’s absolute prohibition problematic and support some degree of paternalism. John Rawls’ Principle of Fairness, for instance has been argued to be inherently paternalistic. If one has to put it in a nutshell, the aspect about paternalism that makes it controversial is that it involves coercion or interference, which in any theory of normative ethics or political science needs to be justified based on certain identified criteria. Staunch opponents of paternalism believe that this justification can never be met. Most scholars however, do not argue that all forms of paternalism are untenable and the bulk of scholarship on paternalism is devoted to formulating the conditions under which this justification is satisfied.

Paternalism interferes with self-autonomy in two ways according to Peter de Marneffe, the Professor of Philosophy at the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Arizona State University.[9] The first is the prohibition principle, under which a person’s autonomy is violated by being prohibited from making a choice. The second is the opportunity principle which undermines the autonomy of a person by reducing his opportunities to make a choice. Both the cases should be predicated upon a finding that the paternalistic act will lead to welfare or greater autonomy. According to de Marneffe, there are three conditions under which such acts of paternalism are justified – the benefits of welfare should be substantial, evident and must outweigh the benefits of self-autonomy.[10]

There are two main strands of arguments made against paternalism.[11] The first argues that interference with the choices of informed adults will always be an inferior option to letting them decide for themselves, as each person is the ‘best judge’ of his or her interests. The second strand does not engage with the question about whether paternalism can make better decisions about individuals, but states that any benefit derived from the paternalist act is outweighed by the harm of violation of self-autonomy. Most proponents of soft-paternalism build on this premise by trying to demonstrate that not all paternalistic acts violate self-autonomy. There are various forms of paternalism that we do not question despite them interfering with our autonomy – seat belt laws and restriction of tobacco advertising being a few of them. If we try to locate arguments for self-autonomy in the Kantian framework, it refers not just to the ability to do what one chooses, but to rational self-governance.[12] This theory automatically “opens the door for justifiable paternalism.”[13] In this paper, I assume that certain forms of paternalism are justified. In the remaining two section, I will look at two different theories advocating greater paternalism in the context of privacy governance and try to examine the merits and issues with such measures.

A moral obligation to protect one’s privacy

Modest Paternalism

In her book, Unpopular Privacy,[14] Anita Allen states that enough emphasis is not placed by people on the value of privacy. The right of individuals to exercise their free will and under the ‘notice and consent’ regime, give up their rights to privacy as they deem fit is, according to her, problematic. The data protection law in most jurisdictions, is designed to be largely value-neutral in that it does not sit on judgement on what is the nature of information that is being revealed and how the collector uses it. Its primary emphasis is on providing the data subject with information about the above and allowing him to make informed decisions. In my previous post, Scott Mason and I had discussed that with online connectivity becomes increasingly important to participation in modern life, the choice to withdraw completely is becoming less and less of a genuine option.[15] Lamenting that people put little emphasis on privacy and often give away information which, upon retrospection and due consideration, they would feel, they ought not have disclosed, Allen proposes what she calls ‘modest paternalism’ in which regulations mandate that individuals do not waive their privacy is certain limited circumstances.

Allen acknowledges the tension between her arguments in favor of paternalism and her avowed support for the liberal ideals of autonomy and that government interference should be limited, to the extent possible. However, she tries to make a case for greater paternalism in the context of privacy. She begins by categorizing privacy as a “primary good” essential for “self respect, trusting relationships, positions of responsibility and other forms of flourishing.” In another article, Allen states that this “technophilic generation appears to have made disclosure the default rule of everyday life.”[16] Relying on various anecdotes and examples of individuals’ disregard for privacy, she argues that privacy is so “neglected in contemporary life that democratic states, though liberal and feminist, could be justified in undertaking a rescue mission that includes enacting paternalistic privacy laws for the benefit of un-eager beneficiaries.” She does state that in most cases it may be more advantageous to educate and incentivise individuals towards making choices that favor greater privacy protection. However, in exceptional cases, paternalism would be justified as a tool to ensure greater privacy.

A duty towards oneself

In an article for the Harvard Symposium on Privacy in 2013, Allen states that laws generally provide a framework built around rights of individuals that enable self-protection and duties towards others. G A Cohen describes Robert Nozick’s views which represents this libertarian philosophy as follows: “The thought is that each person is the morally rightful owner of himself. He possesses over himself, as a matter of moral right, all those rights that a slaveholder has over a chattel slave as a matter of legal right, and he is entitled, morally speaking, to dispose over himself in the way such a slaveholder is entitled, legally speaking, to dispose over his slave.”[17] As per the libertarian philosophy espoused by Nozick, everyone is licensed to abuse themselves in the same manner slaveholders abused their slaves.

Allen asks the question whether there is a duty towards oneself and if such a duty exists, should it be reflected in policy or law. She accepts that a range of philosophers consider the idea of duties to oneself as illogical or untenable. [18] Allen, however relies on the works of scholars such as Lara Denis, Paul Eisenberg and Daniel Kading who have located such a duty. She develops a schematic of two kinds of duties – first order duties that requires we protect ourselves for the sake of others, and second order, derivative duties that we protect ourself. Through the essay, she relies on the Kantian framework of categorical imperative to build the moral thrust of her arguments. Kantian view of paternalism would justify those acts which interfere with an individual’s autonomy in order to prevent her from exercising her autonomy irrationally, and draw her towards rational end that agree with her conception of good.[19] However, Allen goes one step further and she locates the genesis for duties to both others (perfect duties) and oneself (imperfect duties) in the categorical imperative . Her main thesis is that there are certain situations where we have a moral duty to protect our own privacy where failure to do so would have an impact on either specific others or the society, at large.

Issues

Having built this interesting and somewhat controversial premise, Allen does not sufficiently expand upon it to present a nuanced solution. She provides a number of anecdotes but does not formulate any criteria for when privacy duties could be self-regarding. Her test for what kinds of paternalistic acts are justified is also extremely broad. She argues for paternalism where is protects privacy rights that “enhance liberty, liberal ways of life, well-being and expanded opportunity.” She does not clearly define the threshold for when policy should move from incentives to regulatory mandate nor does she elaborate upon what forms paternalism would both serve the purpose of protecting privacy as well as ensuring that there is no unnecessary interference with the rights of individual.[20]

Nudge and libertarian paternalism

What is nudge?

In 2006, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein published their book Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness. [21] The central thesis of the book is that in order to make most of decisions, we rely on a menu of options made available to us and the order and structure of choices is characterised by Thaler and Sunstein as “choice architecture.” According to them, the choice architecture has a significant impact on the choices that we make. The book looks at examples from a food cafeteria, the position of restrooms and how whether the choice is to opt-in or opt-out influences the retirement plans that were chosen. This choice architecture influences our behavior without coercion or a set of incentives, as conventional public policy theory would have us expect. The book draws on work done by cognitive scientists such as Daniel Kahneman[22] and Amos Tversky[23] as well as Thaler’s own research in behavioral economics. [24] The key takeaway from cognitive science and behavioral economics used in this book is that choice architecture influences our actions in anticipated ways and leads to predictably irrational behavior. Thaler and Sunstein believe that this presents a great potential for policy makers. They can tweak the choice architecture in their specific domains to influence the decisions made by its subjects and nudge them towards behavior that is beneficial to them and/or the society.

The great attraction of the argument made by Thaler and Sunstein is that it offers a compromise between forbearance and mandatory regulation. If we identify the two ends of the policy spectrum as – a) paternalists who believe in maximum interference through legal regulations that coerce behavior to meet the stated goals of the policy, and b) libertarians who believe in the free market theory that relies on the individuals making decisions in their best interests, ‘nudging’ falls somewhere in the middle, leading to the oxymoronic yet strangely apt phrase, “libertarian paternalism.” The idea is to design choices in such as way that they influence decision-making so as to increase individual and societal welfare. In his book, The Laws of Fear, Cass Sunstein argues that the anti-paternalistic position is incoherent as “there is no way to avoid effects on behavior and choices.”

The proponents of libertarian paternalism refute the commonly posed question about who decides the optimal and desirable results of choice architecture, by stating that this form of paternalism does not promote a perfectionist standard of welfare but an individualistic and subjective standard. According to them, choices are not prohibited, cordoned off or made to carry significant barriers. However, it is often difficult to conclude what it is that is better for the welfare of people, even from their own point of view. The claim that nudges lead to choices that make them better off by their own standards seems more and more untenable. What nudges do is lead people towards certain broad welfare which the choice-architects believe make the lives of people better in the longer term.[25]

How nudges could apply to privacy?

Our previous post echoes the assertion made by Thaler and Sunstein that the traditional rational choice theory that assumes that individuals will make rationally optimal choices in their self interest when provided with a set of incentives and disincentives, is largely a fiction. We have argued that this assertion holds true in the context of privacy protection principles of notice and informed consent. Daniel Solove has argued that insights from cognitive science, particularly using the theory of nudge would be an acceptable compromise between the inefficacy of privacy self-management and the dangers of paternalism.[26] His rationale is that while nudges influence choice, they are not overly paternalistic in that they still give the individual the option of making choices contrary to those sought by the choice architecture. This is an important distinction and it demonstrates that ‘nudging’ is less coercive than how we generally understand paternalistic policies.

One of the nudging techniques which makes a lot of sense in the context of the data protection policies is the use of defaults. It relies on the oft-mentioned status quo bias.[27] This is mentioned by Thaler and Sunstein with respect to encouraging retirement savings plans and organ donation, but would apply equally to privacy. A number of data collectors have maximum disclosure as their default settings and effort in understanding and changing these settings is rarely employed by users. A rule which mandates that data collectors set optimal defaults that ensure that the most sensitive information is subjected to least degree of disclosure unless otherwise chosen by the user, will ensure greater privacy protection.

Ryan Calo and Dr. Victoria Groom explored an alternative to the traditional notice and consent regime at the Centre of Internet and Society, Stanford University.[28] They conducted a two-phase experimental study. In the first phase, a standard privacy notice was compared with a control condition and a simplified notice to see if improving the readability impacted the response of users. In the second phase, the notice was compared with five notices strategies, out of which four were intended to enhance privacy protective behavior and one was intended to lower it. Shara Monteleone and her team used a similar approach but with a much larger sample size.[29] One of the primary behavioral insights used was that when we do repetitive activities including accepting online terms and conditions or privacy notices, we tend to use our automatic or fast thinking instead to reflective or slow thinking.[30] Changing them requires leveraging the automatic behavior of the individuals.

Alessandro Acquisti, Professor of Information Technology and Public Policy at the Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, has studied the application of methodologies from behavioral economics to investigate privacy decision-making.[31] He highlights a variety of factors that distort decision-making such as – “inconsistent preferences and frames of judgment; opposing or contradictory needs (such as the need for publicity combined with the need for privacy); incomplete information about risks, consequences, or solutions inherent to provisioning (or protecting) personal information; bounded cognitive abilities that limit our ability to consider or reflect on the consequences of privacy-relevant actions; and various systematic (and therefore predictable) deviations from the abstractly rational decision process.” Acquisti looks at three kinds of policy solutions taking the example of social networking sites collecting sensitive information- a) hard paternalistic approach which ban making visible certain kind of information on the site, b) a usability approach that entails designing the system in way that is most intuitive and easy for users to decide whether to provide the information, c) a soft paternalistic approach which seeks to aid the decision-making by providing other information such as how many people would have access to the information, if provided, and set defaults such that the information is not visible to others unless explicitly set by the user. The last two approaches are typically cited as examples of nudging approaches to privacy.

Another method is to use tools that lead to decreased disclosure of information. For example, tools like Social Media Sobriety Test[32] or Mail Goggles[33] serve to block the sites during certain hours set by user during which one expects to be at their most vulnerable, and the online services are blocked unless the user can pass a dexterity examination.[34] Rebecca Belabako and her team are building privacy enhanced tools for Facebook and Twitter that will provide greater nudges in restricting who they share their location on Facebook and restricting their tweets to smaller group of people.[35] Ritu Gulia and Dr. Sapna Gambhir have suggested nudges for social networking websites that randomly select pictures of people who will have access to the information to emphasise the public or private setting of a post.[36] These approaches try to address the myopia bias where we choose immediate access to service over long term privacy harms.

The use of nudges as envisioned in the examples above is in some ways an extension of already existing research which advocates a design standard that makes the privacy notices more easily intelligible.[37] However, studies show only an insignificant improvement by using these methods. Nudging, in that sense goes one step ahead. Instead of trying to make notices more readable and enable informed consent, the design standard will be intended to simply lead to choices that the architects deem optimal.

Issues with nudging

One of the primary justifications that Thaler and Sunstein put forward for nudging is that the choice architecture is ubiquitous. The manner in which option are presented to us impact how we make decision whether it was intended to do so or not, and that there is no such thing a neutral architecture. This inevitability, according to them, makes a strong case for nudging people towards choices that will lead to their well-being. However, this assessment does not support the arguments made by them that libertarian paternalism nudges people towards choices from their own point of view. It is my contention that various examples of libertarian paternalism, as put forth by Thaler and Sunstein, do in fact interfere with our self-autonomy as the choice architecture leads us not to options that we choose for ourselves in a fictional neutral environments, but to those options that the architects believe are good for us. This substitution of judgment would satisfy the definition by Seana Shiffron. Second, the fact that there is no such things as a neutral architecture, is by itself, not justification enough for nudging. If we view the issue only from the point of view of normative ethics, assuming that coercion and interference are undesirable, intentional interference is much worse than unintentional interference.

However, there are certain nudges that rely primarily on providing information, dispensing advice and rational persuasion.[38] The freedom of choice is preserved in these circumstances. Libertarians may argue that even these circumstances the shaping of choice is problematic. This issue, J S Blumenthal-Barby argues, is adequately addressed by the publicity condition, a concept borrowed by Thaler and Sunstein from John Rawls.[39] The principle states that officials should never use a technique they would be uncomfortable defending to the public; nudging is no exception. However, this seems like a simplistic solution to a complex problem. Nudges are meant to rely on inherent psychological tendencies, leveraging the theories about automatic and subconscious thinking as described by Daniel Kahneman in his book, “Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow.”[40] In that sense, while transparency is desirable it may not be very effective.

Other commentators also note that while behavioral economics can show why people make certain decisions, it may not be able to reliably predict how people will behave in different circumstances. The burden of extrapolating the observations into meaningful nudges may prove to be too heavy.[41] However, the most oft-quoted criticism of nudging is that it will rely on officials to formulate the desired goals towards which the choice architecture will lead us.[42] The judgments of these officials could be flawed and subject to influence by large corporations.[43] These concerns echo the best judge argument made against all forms of paternalism, mentioned earlier in this essay. J S Blumenthal-Barby, Assistant Professor at the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, also examines the claim that the choice architects will be susceptible to the same biases while designing the choice environment.[44] His first argument in response to this is that experts who extensively study decision-making may be less prone to these errors. Second, he argues that even with errors and biases, a choice architecture which attempts to the rights the wrongs of a random and unstructured choice environment is a preferable option.[45]

Conclusion

Most libertarians will find the notion that individuals are prevented from sharing some information about themselves problematic. Anita Allen’s idea about self-regarding duties is at odds how we understand rights and duties in most jurisdictions. Her attempt to locate an ethical duty to protect one’s privacy, while interesting, is not backed by a formulation of how such a duty would work. While she relies largely on an Kantian framework, her definition of paternalism, as can be drawn from her writing is broader than that articulated by Kant himself. On the other hand, Thaler and Sunstein’s book Nudge and related writings by them do attempt to build a framework of how nudging would work and answer some questions they anticipate would be raised against the idea of libertarian paternalism.

By and large, I feel that, Thaler and Sunstein’s idea of libertarian paternalism could be justified in the context of privacy and data protection governance. It would be fair to say the first two conditions of de Marneffe under which such acts of paternalism are justified [46] are largely satisfied by nudges that ensures greater privacy protection. If nudges can ensure greater privacy protection, its benefits are both substantial and evident. However, the larger question is whether these purported benefits outweigh the costs of loss of self-autonomy. Given the numerous ways in which the ‘notice and consent’ framework is ineffective and leads to very little informed consent, it can be argued that there is little exercise of autonomy, to begin with, and hence, the loss of self-autonomy is not substantial. Some of the conceptual issues which doubt the ability of nudges to solve complex problems remain unanswered and we will have to wait for more analysis by both cognitive scientists and policy-makers. However, given the growing inefficacy of the existing privacy protection framework, it would be a good idea of begin using some insights from cognitive science and behavioral economics to ensure greater privacy protection.

The current value-neutrality of data protection law with respect of the kind of data collected and its use, and its complete reliance on the data subject to make an informed choice is, in my opinion, an idea that has run its course. Rather than focussing solely on the controls at the stage of data collection, I believe we need a more robust theory of how to govern the subsequent uses of data. This will is the focus of the next part of this series in which I will look at the greater use of risk-based approach to privacy protection.


[1] With invaluable inputs from Scott Mason.

[2] Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public, Transaction Publishers, 1925.

[3] Jonathan Obar, Big Data and the Phantom Public: Walter Lippmann and the fallacy of data privacy self management, Big Data and Society, 2015, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239188

[4] Anita Allen, Unpopular Privacy: What we must hide?, Oxford University Press USA, 2011.

[5] Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge, Improving decisions about health, wealth and happinessYale University Press, 2008.

[7] Christian Coons and Michael Weber, ed., Paternalism: Theory and Practice; Cambridge University Press, 2013. at 29.

[8] Seana Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2682745

[9] Peter de Marneffe, Self Sovereignty and Paternalism, from Christian Coons and Michael Weber, ed., Paternalism: Theory and Practice; Cambridge University Press, 2013. at 58.

[10] Id .

[11] Christian Coons and Michael Weber, ed., Paternalism: Theory and Practice; Cambridge University Press, 2013. at 74.

[12] Christian Coons and Michael Weber, ed., Paternalism: Theory and Practice; Cambridge University Press, 2013. at 115.

[13] Ibid at 116.

[14] Anita Allen, Unpopular Privacy: What we must hide?, Oxford University Press USA, 2011.

[15] Janet Vertasi, My Experiment Opting Out of Big Data Made Me Look Like a Criminal, 2014, available at http://time.com/83200/privacy-internet-big-data-opt-out/

[16] Anita Allen, Privacy Law: Positive Theory and Normative Practice, available at http://harvardlawreview.org/2013/06/privacy-law-positive-theory-and-normative-practice/ .

[17] G A Cohen, Self ownership, world ownership and equality, available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3093280

[19] Michael Cholbi, Kantian Paternalism and suicide intervention, from Christian Coons and Michael Weber, ed., Paternalism: Theory and Practice; Cambridge University Press, 2013.

[20] Eric Posner, Liberalism and Concealment, available at https://newrepublic.com/article/94037/unpopular-privacy-anita-allen

[21] Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge, Improving decisions about health, wealth and happinessYale University Press, 2008.

[22] Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

[23] Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases, Cambridge University Press, 1982; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

[24] Richard Thaler, Advances in behavioral finance, Russell Sage Foundation, 1993.

[25] Thaler, Sunstein and Balz, Choice Architecture, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1583509.

[26] Daniel Solove, Privacy self-management and consent dilemma, 2013 available at http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2093&context=faculty_publications

[27] Frederik Borgesius, Behavioral sciences and the regulation of privacy on the Internet, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2513771.

[28] Ryan Calo and Dr. Victoria Groom, Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An experimental study, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993125

[29] Shara Monteleon et al, Nudges to Privacy Behavior: Exploring an alternative approahc to privacy notices, available at http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC96695/jrc96695.pdf

[30] Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

[31] Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy, available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-privacy-nudging.pdf

[34] Rebecca Balebako et al, Nudging Users towards privacy on mobile devices, available at https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/pgl/paper6.pdf.

[35] Id .

[36] Ritu Gulia and Dr. Sapna Gambhir, Privacy and Privacy Nudges for OSNs: A Review, available at http://www.ijircce.com/upload/2014/march/14L_Privacy.pdf

[37] Annie I. Anton et al., Financial Privacy Policies and the Need for Standardization, 2004 available at https://ssl.lu.usi.ch/entityws/Allegati/pdf_pub1430.pdf; Florian Schaub, R. Balebako et al, “A Design Space for effective privacy notices” available at https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2015/soups15-paper-schaub.pdf

[38] Daniel Hausman and Bryan Welch argue that these cases are mistakenly characterized as nudges. They believe that nudges do not try to inform the automatic system, but manipulate the inherent cognitive biases. Daniel Hausman and Bryan Welch, Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge, Journal of Political Philosophy 18(1).

[39] Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge or Notice, available at

[40] Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

[41] Evan Selinger and Kyle Powys Whyte, Nudging cannot solve complex policy problems.

[42] Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1310732; Pierre Schlag, Nudge, Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585362.

[43] Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917383.

[44] J S Blumenthal-Barby, Choice Architecture: A mechanism for improving decisions while preserving liberty?, from Christian Coons and Michael Weber, ed., Paternalism: Theory and Practice; Cambridge University Press, 2013.

[45] Id .

[46] According to de Marneffe, there are three conditions under which such acts of paternalism are justified – the benefits of welfare should be substantial, evident and must outweigh the benefits of self-autonomy. Peter de Marneffe, Self Sovereignty and Paternalism, from Christian Coons and Michael Weber, ed., Paternalism: Theory and Practice; Cambridge University Press, 2013. at 58.

This post was originially published at Centre for Internet and Society’s blog.

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